In the recent philosophy of explanation, a growing attention to and discussion of non-causal explanations has emerged, as there seem to be compelling examples of non-causal explanations in the sciences, in pure mathematics, and in metaphysics.
• Non-causal explanations in pure mathematics. Philosophers of mathematics and mathematicians distinguish between explanatory and non-explanatory proofs, where the former are taken to be explanatory in a non-causal way (see, for instance, in the recent literature, Mancosu 2008 Mancosu , 2011 and Lange 2014; see Steiner 1978; Kitcher 1984 Kitcher , 1989 for pioneering work). The explananda of explanatory proofs in pure mathematics are theorems, while applied mathematical explanations explain the occurrence of contingent phenomena.
• Non-causal explanations in metaphysics. A growing number of metaphysicians adopt the view that if one kind of facts grounds another kind of facts, then the former facts metaphysically explain why the latter kind of facts exists.
3 For instance, a physicalist holds that if physical facts ground mental facts, then the physical facts metaphysically explain the existence of the mental facts. In the current debates in metaphysics, grounding is taken to be a non-causal dependence relation whose explanatory power is, thus, noncausal (to take only a few voices from the enormous literature on grounding, see Fine 2001 Fine , 2012 Schaffer 2009 Schaffer , 2015 Schnieder 2011; Correira and Schnieder 2012a; Loewer 2012; Ruben 2012; Wilson manuscript) .
The view that there are non-causal explanations in the sciences, in pure mathematics, and in metaphysics raises an interesting challenge, because this view is, prima facie, in tension with the currently dominating causal accounts of explanation in philosophy of science and elsewhere. According to causal accounts, there is a tight conceptual connection between explaining and candidates for non-causal explanations in the life and social sciences (Strogatz 1994; Barabasi et al. 2006; Huneman 2010) . 3 Note that grounding need not be restricted to facts. It can be extended to other kinds of entities (see Fine 2001 Fine , 2012 Schaffer 2009) .
not address the issue of whether the CTE is applicable to explanations in pure mathematics in this paper.
The plan of the paper is as follows: in section 2, I introduce the counterfactual theory of explanation. In section 3, I argue that the counterfactual theory can be successfully applied to Euler's explanation -the main purpose of this section (and of using Euler's explanation) is to illustrate how the CTE works for the (toy) case of a non-causal explanation in the sciences. In section 4, I will explore whether the CTE also applies to Loewer's explanation. In section 5, I
qualify the CTE in three respects.
The Counterfactual Theory of Explanation
Is there a monist alternative to Hempel's troubled monism? It is fruitful to take a suggestion of Peter Lipton's as a stepping-stone for developing such a monist account. Having presented several examples of non-causal explanations, Lipton outlines a monist strategy for capturing both non-causal and causal explanations (in science): "One reaction to this would be to attempt to expand the notion of causation to some broader notion of 'determination' that would encompass the non-causal cases […] ." (Lipton 2004: 32) 6 However, Lipton is skeptical as to the causes of the explanandum' figuring in the causal accounts I have referred to earlier. For instance, Lewis and Skow hold that one explains causally by merely excluding a possible causal history of some explanandum E, or by stating that E has no cause at all -while other causal accounts would not classify this sort of information as causally explanatory. I cannot enter an in-depth discussion of the merits of causal reductionism here. I take it as premise -against causal reductionism -that there actually are non-causal explanations including the examples listed above and the two examples I will discuss in Sections 3 and 4. 6 See Kim (1974) and Ruben (2012) for related suggestions.
whether one can prevent such a "broader notion of determination" from collapsing into Hempelian monism:
This approach has merit, but it will be difficult to come up with such a notion that we understand even as well as causation, without falling into the relation of deductive determination, which will expose the model to many of the objections to the deductivenomological model. (Lipton 2004: 32) I think Lipton was too hasty in dismissing the merit of explicating "some broader notion of 'determination' that would encompass the non-causal cases" (ibid.), because such a philosophical project need not necessarily rely on the covering-law account and a "relation of deductive determination" (ibid.). Following Lipton's original suggestion, my claim is that Lipton's envisioned broader notion of determination is the notion of the counterfactual dependence (of the explanandum on the explanans), as captured by counterfactual theories of explanation (for short, CTE). Perhaps the most influential version of the CTE 7 is James Woodward's (see Woodward 2003; and already Woodward 1979 8 ). Woodward summarizes the CTE as follows:
An explanation ought to be such that it enables us to see what sort of difference it would have made for the explanandum if the factors cited in the explanans had been different in various possible ways. 7 I adopt Woodward's (2003) terminology in calling it a counterfactual theory. 8 It is interesting that Woodward (1979: 45-46) takes the CTE to be a charitable revision of the covering law account. (Woodward 2003: 11) Explanation is a matter of exhibiting systematic patterns of counterfactuals dependence. (Woodward 2003: 191) The CTE is prima facie appealing from a monist perspective for two reasons: first, Woodward's (2003: §5.3, §5.8 ) CTE avoids the notorious problems of the covering-law account (see below for a qualification of this claim). Second, although Woodward's version of the CTE -and the underlying interventionist theory of causation -is mainly intended to fit causal explanations, the core idea of the CTE provides a natural way for specifying Lipton's "broader notion of determination". As Woodward suggests himself (but does not elaborate):
[T]he common element in many forms of explanation, both causal and non-causal, is that they must answer what-if-things-had-beendifferent questions. (Woodward 2003: 221) .
Answering "what-if-things-had-been-different questions" amounts to revealing (or exhibiting) -in Woodward's words -what sort of difference it would have made for the explanandum if the factors cited in the explanans had been different in various possible ways. The monist proposal, according to the CTE, is that causal and non-causal explanations are explanatory by virtue of exhibiting how the explanandum counterfactually depends on the explanans (Woodward 2003: 13) . Or, putting it in Lipton's terms, the notion of counterfactual dependence is the broader notion of determination that one "expands" from causal explanations such that it encompasses the non-causal explanations. This CTE-based monism has been explored, among others, by Frisch (1998) , Bokulich (2008) , Saatsi and Pexton (2013) , Saatsi (forthcoming) , and (AUTHOR) in the context of scientific explanations. My goal is to further elaborate and advance the CTE and to apply it to a novel example of non-causal explanations that proponents of the CTE have not yet addressed: namely, to a metaphysical explanation (Loewer's explanation).
I will start with reconstructing the CTE in a way that emphasizes the "common element" (Woodward 2003: 221) of causal and non-causal explanations -this common element, I conjecture, is not essentially tied to an interventionist approach to causation (I will return to this issue below). In this reconstruction I largely follow Woodward's (2003: 203) and Woodward and Hitchcock's (2003: 6, 18 ) exposition of the CTE. As a first step, the structure of an explanation has two parts: first, a statement E about the explanandum phenomenon; second, an explanans consisting of generalizations G 1 , …, G m and auxiliary statements S 1 , …, S n . Auxiliary statements often are statements about initial or boundary conditions specifying the state of the explanandum system (as Hitchcock and Woodward highlight those statements typically assert that variables take a certain value). But the auxiliary statements may also comprise other kinds of statements useful for explanations (for instance, Nagelian bridge laws, symmetry assumptions, limit theorems, and other modeling assumptions). According to the CTE, the relationship between the explanans and the explanandum is explanatory iff the following conditions are all satisfied:
1. Veridicality condition: G 1 , …, G m , S 1 , …, S n , and E are (approximately) true or, at least, well confirmed.
2. Implication condition: G 1 , …, G m and S 1 , …, S n logically entail E or a conditional probability P(E|S 1 , …, S n ) -where the conditional probability need not be 'high' in contrast to Hempel's covering-law account.
3. Dependency condition: G 1 , …, G m support at least one counterfactual of the form: had S 1 , …, S n been different than they actually are (in at least one way deemed possible in the light of the generalizations), then E or the conditional probability of E would have been different as well.
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The CTE provides a monist framework for causal and non-causal explanationsboth kinds of explanation are explanatory because they rely on approximately true assumptions in the explanans, the explanans implies (a probability for the) explanandum, and, crucially, both kinds of explanation reveal counterfactual dependencies between the explanandum and the explanans.
Illustrating the Counterfactual Theory: Euler's explanation
I will now argue for the claim that the CTE applies to one paradigmatic example of a non-causal scientific explanations, Euler's explanation. I take Euler's explanation to be a 'toy' example of a non-causal scientific explanation. The purpose of using Euler's explanation is mainly to illustrate how the CTE applies to a non-causal explanation in the scientific domain (for an application of the CTE to 'more serious' non-causal scientific explanations, see Frisch 1998; Bokulich 9 I assume that a generalization supports counterfactuals only if the generalization is non-accidentally true or lawful. I use a broad notion of laws that includes nonstrict ceteris paribus laws, such as Woodward and Hitckcock's own invariance account. However, my aim here is not to defend a particular view of laws. I want to suggest instead that the CTE is neutral with respect to alternative theories of non-accidental truth or lawhood. I take this to be a strength of the CTE. Therefore, I conclude that the CTE applies to Euler's explanation. 11 Although the veridicality condition is met in the case of Euler's explanation, one might worry that it does not hold for all scientific explanation, because (a) many scientific explanations involve idealized assumption, and (b) how-possibly explanations play an important epistemic role in the sciences. Both idealized and how-possibly explanations do not meet the veridicality condition. Regarding idealized explanations, it is, however, often possible to (re)interpret the idealizations in a way that is compatible with the veridicality condition by adopting, for instance, a dispositionalist and minimalist accounts of idealizations (see Cartwright 1989; Hüttemann 2004; Strevens 2008) . Regarding how-possibly explanations, I ultimately agree that the veridicality condition has to be rejected, if the CTE is supposed to be an account of both how-possibly and how-actually explanations. However, many prominent accounts of explanations (including Woodward's version of the CTE) are (at least, implicitly) presented as accounts of how-actually explanations. In this vein, I also introduce the CTE as an account of how-actually explanations; this account can, of course, be weakened in the case of how-possibly explanations (see Reutlinger et al. for my approach to how-possibly explanations and toy models). One further difference between metaphysical and scientific explanation is that the latter but not the former may be probabilistic.
(ibid.)
For present purposes, I agree with Loewer that scientific explanations differ from metaphysical explanations with respect to these features.
My focus is on the question whether we can make sense of the explanatory character of metaphysical and scientific explanations by using the same theory of explanation -even if scientific and metaphysical explanation differ in some features, as Loewer claims. Loewer explicitly puts this question aside, since he pursues other goals in his paper: "I don't have anything like a thorough account of metaphysical explanation (or for that matter of scientific explanation)" (Loewer 2012: 131) . In the remainder of this section, I will explore whether the CTE captures Loewer's explanation as a specific non-scientific kind of non-causal explanation. My claim is that the CTE applies, if one is prepared to accept a salient epistemological difference between metaphysical and scientific explanations.
Loewer's explanation satisfies the structure that the CTE requires. The explanans consists of two elements: first, a metaphysical and intuitively noncausal grounding generalization 'the entire Humean mosaic grounds the nomic . Second, the explanans also includes the auxiliary statements including (i) a description of the entire Humean mosaic M of some world w (in terms of fundamental predicates) 13 , (ii) the assumption that the best system account (BSA) of laws is true (see Lewis 1973 Lewis , 1994 ; for Loewer's amendment of Lewis' original account see Loewer 2001 Loewer , 2008 Loewer , 2012 . The explanandum phenomenon is that certain facts or propositions (call them 'n-facts') are the nomic facts or propositions of a world w.
14 Does Loewer's explanation satisfy the three constraints of the CTE? Two of the three conditions are met:
• Implication Condition: The elements of the explanans (consisting of the 12 It is a controversial issue whether the Humean grounding generalization (or a Humean supervenience claim) holds in all possible worlds, or only in a restricted class of worlds (see Hall 2012 for an overview). 13 See Cohen and Callender (2009) for a version of the BSA that is not committed to fundamental (or natural) predicates. 14 While Loewer seems to accept the grounding generalization as a key part of the explanans, there might be an alternative version of the Humean metaphysical explanation of laws that does not rely on grounding. This version is inspired by the Canberra plan. According to the Canberra plan version, the explanans consists of the following assumptions: (1) Conceptual analysis: A general statement l is a law in world w iff l is a theorem or axiom of the best system of w. (2) Empirical fact: The mosaic of a world w is such that l is an axiom or theorem of the best system of w. Assumptions (1) and (2) entail the explanandum: (3) Statement l is a law in w. The crucial point here is that the CTE also captures the Canberra plan version of the Humean explanation of laws. Most importantly, the decisive counterfactual is true in Loewer's version and in the Canberra plan version; see below.
description of the entire mosaic M of world w, the grounding generalization, and the BSA) entail that the n-facts are the nomic facts of w.
• Dependency Condition: The grounding generalization (in conjunction with the BSA) supports a counterfactual of the form: there is at least one metaphysically possible way the mosaic could be, M*, such that if the mosaic of world w were M* (and not M, as it actually is), then the n-facts would not be the laws of w. -Being primitively asymmetric, the grounding relation determines the relevant direction of counterfactual dependence, and, hence, the direction of explanation runs from the Humean mosaic (the grounding fact) to the nomic facts (the grounded facts), and not vice versa. In section 5, I
will return to the issue of the asymmetry of non-causal explanations.
Applying the CTE is somewhat less straightforward with regard to the Veridicality Condition. Certainly, Humeans take all of the explanatory assumptions to be true, and these assumptions may as well be true. But we do not know whether the Humean explanans is true. For instance, we do not know what the entire mosaic of our world is like and we do not know whether the Humean grounding generalization is true. Moreover, we do not actually know how to infer the laws from the mosaic; rather we know how to draw this inference only in principle but not in practice (Loewer 2008: 160) . Instead of empirical evidence, Humeans rely on indirect epistemological arguments (see, Earman and Roberts 2005) and ontological arguments based on criteria such as parsimony and fruitfulness (a great example is the interchange between the Humean Loewer [Loewer 2012: sect. 5 ] and the anti-Humean Maudlin [Maudlin 2007: chap. 6 
]).
However, this epistemic situation is by no means a unique feature of Humean metaphysics. We also do not know whether the explanatory assumptions of, say, anti-Humeans are true. In fact, this seems to be the normal epistemic situation in metaphysics and an explicitly acknowledged methodological issue in metametaphysics (see, for instance, the contributions in Ross et al. 2013 ).
This is not necessarily a problem as such, because the CTE, in principle, allows for (scientific and metaphysical) explanations whose explanantia we currently do not (fully) know to be true and perhaps never will -i.e. how-possibly would be different'. In sum, I believe it is only mildly speculative to assert that CTE generalizes to all grounding explanations, if the explanatory grounding facts exist as a matter of metaphysical contingency. For Humeans, the grounding fact, the mosaic, exists contingently; for necessitarians and primitivists, the grounding facts, the laws, exist contingently (for a remark on dispositional essentialism, see footnote 16 below).
Second, the CTE also seems to have clear limitations: prima facie, it does not apply to those metaphysical explanations referring to grounding facts that exist necessarily. Consider a toy example: the mathematical fact that 1+1=2 (that we take to be a necessary fact) grounds the truth of the sentence '1+1=2'. Suppose that, due to the grounding relation, the mathematical fact that 1+1=2 metaphysically explains the truth of the sentence '1+1=2'. According to the CTE, this explanation must involve the counterfactual "if it were the case that 1+1≠2, then the sentence '1+1=2' would be false". The trouble with this counterfactual is that its antecedent expresses an impossible proposition. 16 In order to deal with this difficulty, a proponent of the CTE faces, at least, three options: (i) to defend the ambitious claim that one can evaluate counterfactuals with (logically or metaphysically) impossible antecedents as non-vacuously true or false, and, moreover, that the truth value of those counterfactuals corresponds to our intuitions about the explanation at hand (see Schaffer 2015: sect. 3.1; also Wilson manuscript), (ii) to deny that the grounding claim in question is explanatory, and (iii) to accept that the CTE does not capture all metaphysical explanations (but only those referring to contingently existing grounding facts), and, hence, full fledged monism fails and the CTE ought to be supplemented by an additional theory of those metaphysical explanations drawing on necessarily true
propositions. Discussing the merit of these options is a challenge for future research. I will not even attempt to address these difficult questions in the present 16 At first glance, the same problem appears to arise in the context of dispositional essentialism about laws. According to dispositional essentialism, the nomic essence of some property P grounds the regularities involving instantiation of P in a world (see, for instance, Bird 2007) . A proponent of the CTE might be tempted to cash out the explanatory content of this grounding claim in terms of the counterfactual "if P had a non-actual nomic essence, then regularities would be different than they actually are". According to dispositional essentialism, this antecedent is metaphysically impossible. However, a dispositional essentialist is certainly not committed to this prima facie problematic counterfactual within the CTE framework. A much more plausible and more useful counterfactual is this one: 'if some non-actual 'alien' property P* with a different nomic essence than P's nomic essence were instantiated (rather than P) in world w, then the regularities in w would be different than the actual regularities'. The antecedent of this conditional is not impossible and suffices to spell out the explanatory content of the grounding claim that the dispositional essentialist makes.
paper.
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Qualifications
Let me add three qualifications in order to sharpen the CTE and to avoid potential misunderstandings.
First , Second, the dependency condition can, to a certain extent, be disentangled 17 I believe the very same problem arises in the context of explanations in pure mathematics, where the assumptions in the explanans seem to include necessary truth. It is an open research questions for me whether the CTE applies to explanations in pure mathematics or whether the CTE needs to be supplemented by an alternative theory of explanations in pure mathematics. goal to argue for any particular counterfactual account of causation. As a consequence, I will not commit myself to the claim that -in the context of causal explanation -the counterfactuals mentioned in the dependency condition of the CTE have to be understood as interventionist counterfactuals (unlike, for instance, Schaffer [2015] and Wilson [manuscript] who defend an interventionist approach to grounding).
Let me now address claim (II), i.e. the claim that the dependency condition can be disentangled from a causal interpretation. When discussing examples of non-causal explanations, Woodward himself voices another prima facie convincing reason for not requiring that all explanatory counterfactuals have the form of interventionist counterfactuals: 18 One reason for choosing a non-interventionist counterfactual account of causation is that Woodward's critics have recently argued that interventionist counterfactuals are inherently problematic and ultimately dispensable for understanding causation and causal explanation (see Strevens 2008) . Based on the claims (I) and (II), I work with the minimal assumption that, in the dependency condition of the CTE, one should generally rely on counterfactuals of the form "if S 1 , …, S n had been different than they actually are (in at least one way deemed possible in the light of the generalizations), then E or the conditional probability of E would have been different as well".
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Furthermore, there is also a positive analogy to Woodward's causal CTE regarding the existentially quantified form of the counterfactuals: the qualification 'in at least one way deemed possible in the light of the generalizations' is analogous to the interventionist requirement that there be some possible intervention on the antecedent variable that leads to a change in the consequent variable; it is not required that all possible interventions have such an effect.
Third, I anticipate a potential worry at this point. One may wonder whether the non-causal version of the CTE avoids the problems of the coveringlaw account. I can only sketch how the non-causal version of the CTE responds to these problems:
The problem of irrelevance: To avoid counterexamples such as the birthcontrol pills scenario (Salmon 1989: 50) , the non-causal CTE distinguishes between explanatorily relevant and irrelevant factors as follows: a factor is relevant only if the explanandum counterfactually depends on it (dependency condition), otherwise it is an irrelevant factor.
The problem of low probabilities:
To deal with the syphilis-paresis scenario (Salmon 1989: 49) , the non-causal CTE allows for low probability explanations (implication condition).
The flagpole-shadow scenario: consider the flagpole-shadow scenario (Salmon 1989: 47) . The guiding intuition of the flagpole-shadow scenario is that the 'correct' explanation is a causal explanation (the height of the flagpole causally explains the length of the shadow) and that the covering law account does not have the means to identify it. One might worry that the CTE is also unable to identify the 'correct' causal explanation underlying the flagpole scenario. This worry is, however, unjustified, because the CTE is a theory of causal and non-causal explanations. Applying the CTE to causal explanations may take the form of supplementing the CTE with Woodward's interventionist account of causation as the underlying theory of causation. As Woodward argues successfully (to my mind), a causal version of the CTE adequately describes the flagpole scenario (Woodward 2003: 155, 361) . However, as I pointed out in the second qualification above, a proponent of the CTE is not committed to Woodward's interventionist theory of causation. The CTE in combination with other counterfactual accounts of causation (that do not rely on interventions) also correctly identifies the causal structure underlying the flagpole-shadow scenario (such counterfactual accounts of causation include, for instance, von Wright 1971; Lewis' 2004; Menzies and Price 1993; AUTHOR) . Thus, although the flagpoleshadow scenario is a counterexample to the covering-law accounts, it is not a threat to the CTE.
With respect to the flagpole-shadow scenario 20 , let me emphasize that one should disentangle two questions: (1) the question whether the flagpole-shadow scenario is a counterexample to the CTE, and (2) the question whether all noncausal explanation display an asymmetry. The answers to these questions are logically independent of one another. Regarding (1), I hold that the flagpoleshadow scenario is not a counter-example to the CTE (as I argued above).
Regarding (2), I think there are good reasons to hold that some non-causal explanations are not asymmetric. 21 While I agree that all causal explanations are asymmetric, I believe that some (for instance, Euler's explanation), but not necessarily all, non-causal explanations lack such an asymmetry in that the counterfactual dependence in question is symmetric (for an elaborate argument for this claim see Frisch and Reutlinger manuscript; Kistler 2013 ).
However, the situation is importantly different and more straightforward for metaphysical grounding explanations. The grounding relation underlying a metaphysical explanation is usually taken to be (primitively) asymmetric (Fine 2012; Schaffer 2015; Schnieder forthcoming; see Correira and Schnieder 2012b for an overview). Given that the grounding relation has an in-built asymmetry, the 20 I would like to thank a referee for urging me to address this point. 21 This claim is not necessarily at odds with recent attempts to justify the claim that some non-causal explanations do in fact display an asymmetry (see Lange 2011; Jansson forthcoming).
asymmetry of metaphysical explanations mirrors the underlying asymmetry of grounding (just as the directionality of some scientific explanations mirrors the causal asymmetry). Although I accept that the asymmetry is primitively built into the grounding relation, I do not claim that the explanatory character of grounding relations is a primitively built-in feature of this relation. Instead, the main claim of my paper is that the CTE provides an explication of the explanatory character of grounding explanations (see Section 4).
Conclusion
In the recent philosophy of explanation, a consensus has emerged, according to believe that the CTE is a promising monist approach to explanations in science and metaphysics alike.
